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913 
SURFING THE NET SAFELY AND SMOOTHLY: A 
NEW STANDARD FOR PROTECTING PERSONAL 
INFORMATION FROM HARMFUL AND 
DISCRIMINATORY WAVES 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself having been in the following situations: in high school, 
you surfed the Web to gather research for a psychology class on depression 
and suicide; last year, you looked into Web sites that provide information 
about a genetic disease that runs in your family; six months ago, you bought 
inflammatory CDs on Amazon.com for a friend or listened to this music on 
RealNetworks; a week ago, you looked at law firm Web sites to research 
attorneys who can help clean up the traffic violations on your driving record; 
yesterday, you researched student loan information online. 
In each of these scenarios, you took the chance that the personal 
information you disclosed online (including your surfing habits and any 
information you provided while visiting the Web site) might be used in a 
harmful or discriminatory way.1 For example, an advertising agency, health 
care provider, future employer, credit agency, or insurance company might 
be interested in obtaining this information.2 Given the lack of protection of 
privacy rights in the online environment, these parties could obtain this 
information themselves or a Web site operator could sell it to them. 
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly mention 
privacy, Justice Douglas recognized a right to privacy under the “penumbra 
theory” articulated in the famous Supreme Court case Griswold v. 
Connecticut.3 Under this theory, the Supreme Court has recognized rights 
that can be found in the shadows or emanations of the Bill of Rights.4 
 
 
 1. See Kalinda Basho, The Licensing of Our Personal Information: Is It a Solution to Internet 
Privacy?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1517 (2000) (describing privacy expert Jeffrey Reiman’s recognition 
that threats to our privacy pose a danger to our ability to engage freely in activities on the Internet).  
 2. See id. at 1516. 
 3. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create zones of privacy.”) (citation omitted). See also  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973). 
 4. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. In addition, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In order to raise a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a government search or seizure, a defendant must establish a legitimate expectation of 
privacy upon which the government infringed. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
The legitimate expectation of privacy test entails a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the defendant had 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) whether society is prepared to recognize that 
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Despite the legal recognition that an individual’s interest in maintaining 
privacy deserves constitutional protection, consumer concerns about a lack of 
privacy in the online environment were evident in a 1998 Harris poll on 
consumer privacy. The poll found the following: “Nearly nine in ten 
Americans (88%) say they are ‘concerned about general threats to their 
privacy.’ Eight in ten (82%) feel they have ‘lost all control over how 
companies collect and use their personal information.” Three-fourths (78%) 
say they have not given information to a company online because of their 
concern with a lack of privacy compared with 42% in 1990; and two in five 
(43%) said they had ‘exercised an opportunity to opt-out.’5  
This Note evaluates the problem underlying these scenarios and statistics. 
Part I first examines the history of the collection and use of personal 
information in the traditional sense, and second in the transactional sense. 
Part II considers how the online industry, Congress, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and other academics and theorists are approaching the 
problem of online privacy of personal data. Part III develops background on 
the discriminatory and harmful effects of online profiling of personal 
information and analyzes the various approaches attempting to address the 
problem of online privacy. In Part IV, I conclude that although the regulatory 
approach is currently the best way to address the abuse of personal 
 
 
expectation as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The Supreme Court has also 
held that a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in information that he or she 
voluntarily provides to a third party. See, e.g., Smith , 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that defendant 
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed from his phone because he 
voluntarily provided the numbers to the telephone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
445 (1976) (holding that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records 
since he exposed information in records to bank employees).  
 Courts have applied this assumption of risk rationale to deny an expectation of privacy in 
electronic information voluntarily given online. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 
1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that a user did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-
mail transmission). 
 However, “traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is ill-suited to answer” whether or not a 
user retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her clickstream data. Gavin Skok, Establishing 
a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data , 6 MICH . TELECOMM. & TECH . L. REV. 61, 
62 (2000) (arguing that the assumption of risk principles to online expectation of privacy is flawed 
because it does not take into account the extent of intrusion that occurs when clickstream data is 
collected and because users are unaware of the type or extent of data that Web site operators collect). 
See also  United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (“Cyberspace is a 
nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that connects millions of 
users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.”). Although the cases discussed in this footnote 
involve governmental as opposed to private intrusion into online privacy, they demonstrate that a 
public policy interest exists in protecting online privacy in general. In addition, user ignorance about 
the type or extent of personal information collected online calls for protection against intrusions of 
online privacy, whether by the government or a private entity. 
 5. Beth Givens, Symposium on Internet Privacy: Privacy Expectation in a High Tech World , 16 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 350 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/5
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information, it is not an adequate solution. I propose a new standard for 
privacy policies, which should be incorporated into legislation, in order to 
prevent the discriminatory and harmful effects of online profiling. 
I. HISTORY OF THE COLLECTION AND USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
A. “Traditional” Collection and Use  
The “traditional” collection of information refers to when consumers 
voluntarily and knowingly provide personal information to others.6 For 
example, the government gathers information from citizens when they fill out 
tax forms and applications for various social programs, including Social 
Security, food stamps, Medicare, and Medicaid.7 In addition, private industry 
collects information in this traditional way when consumers apply for credit 
cards or membership to programs, register for access to Web sites, or enter 
contests.8 Employers also collect personal information from employees when 
they gather data for various documents, including applications and 
timesheets.9  
Legislative protection of the privacy of personal data in the United States 
collected in this traditional way applies to particular industries or particular 
kinds of information.10 Several federal statutes regulate the privacy of 
personal data.11 These statutes protect personal information given to 
 
 
 6. Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace , 5 VA. J.L. & 
TECH . 6, ¶ 29 (2000), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/vti2a6-safier.html (noting that a “consumer 
. . . provides personal in formation when she registers, applies, enrolls or requests information, 
products, services or jobs”). The traditional method of collection occurs in both the offline, brick and 
mortar world, as well as in the online world of cyberspace. Thus, the defining characteristic of 
traditional collection of personal information is not where it occurs but rather that it involves 
voluntarily and knowingly giving your information out.  
 7. See id. ¶ 33 (pointing out that “products and services are increasingly becoming contingent” 
so that an individual needs access to one product or service, such as a credit card, in order to gain 
access to another product or service, such as video rental store membership).  
 8. See id. ¶ 32. 
 9. Id. ¶ 34. See also Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An 
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 86 (1996) (emphasizing 
that “[i]nformation provided directly on the application represents only a fraction of the information 
that  employers believe they need” as employers often require other information, such as the results of 
physical and psychological examinations). 
 10. Existing privacy legislation has been described as “sectoral,” meaning that the laws are 
narrow and apply only to particular sectors of industry or information. See Karl D. Belgum, Who 
Leads at Half-time?: Three Conflicting Visions of Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH . 1, 
¶ 24 (1999), available at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/belgum.html; Scott Killingsworth, 
Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 
79 (1999). 
 11. For an excellent compilation of e-commerce legislation, see generally Baker & Mckenzie, 
Congress: E-Commerce Legislation and Regulation, at http://www.bmck.com/ecommerce/congress. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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traditional collectors such as the Department of Motor Vehicles,12 video 
rental stores,13 cable operators,14 and educational institutions.15  
B. “Non-traditional” Collection and Use or “Transaction Generated 
Information”:16 the Process of Online Profiling 
“Transaction generated information” involves consumers interacting 
directly with cyberspace through networked technology, such as a computer, 
a telephone, an ATM machine, or a credit or debit card, in such a way that 
they are not aware of exactly how or what kind of personal information is 
being collected.17 Usually, when Web sites collect transaction generated 
information, the consumer has already had personal information collected via 
the traditional method, which produced “identifiers” such as identification 
numbers, including credit card numbers or a Social Security number, or 
passwords.18 In complex networks, identifiers can link to previous identifiers, 
creating a detailed informational profile of an individual.19  
After this transaction generated information is collected, it is processed in 
such a way that information is classified, categorized, sorted, and then 
stored.20 The most widespread use of this compiled personal information is 
direct marketing, which involves tailoring marketing and advertising to 
 
 
htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2001) (providing a list of enacted and pending legislation relating to e-
commerce). 
 12. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) (safeguarding the personal 
information of licensed drivers from improper use or disclosure of information contained in their 
drivers’ records).   
 13. Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (preventing a video rental store from 
revealing the titles of movies a customer has rented).  
 14. Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000) (requiring cable operators to 
obtain written or electronic consent before disclosing personal information). 
 15. Family Education Rights & Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1974) (limiting the improper 
disclosure of children’s personal information and giving parents the right to inspect their children’s 
information). 
 16. Safier, supra note 6, ¶ 36. 
 17. See id.  
 18. Id. Information collected using the traditional method is more valuable after it has been 
processed or entered cyberspace through a computer, for example, because it is inexpensive and 
efficient to transfer and can be combined with other information previously collected. Id. 
 19. Id. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how a profile might be compiled:  
[I]magine that Bob purchases a new maroon blazer from the Gap with his recently acquired Gap 
charge card. Perhaps Bob’s first identifier (the Gap identifier or charge account number) links to 
his bank account number, which then links to his credit card number, and all the corresponding 
information. The credit card identifier might, in turn be linked to a Social Security number, and 
thereby, Bob’s census, IRS, health, insurance, spring break arrest and employer information. 
Id. ¶ 37. 
 20. Id. ¶ 53. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/5
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specific audiences or groups of consumers.21 The cyberspace version of real 
space direct marketing also occurs through the use of intelligent agents22 and 
push technologies,23 which one commentator has deemed “direct marketing 
on steroids.”24 These technologies memorize and process a consumer’s 
clickstream,25 purchases, and amount of money and time spent shopping 
online and deliver ads targeted to meet the consumer’s interests and 
preferences apparent in his or her profile.26  
For example, Web sites identify repeat users through the use of “cookies,” 
small files inserted into a user’s hard drive, which the Web site accesses 
 
 
 21. Id. ¶ 60. See also Gandy, supra note 9, at 89 (noting that “profiles are used by direct 
marketers to estimate the probability of an affirmative response by consumers they have assigned to 
different categories or groups”). 
 22. The definition of an “agent” is as follows: 
A program that searches through archives or other repositories of information on a topic specified 
by the user. Agents of this sort are used most often on the Internet and are generally dedicated to 
searching a single type of information repository, such as posting on Usenet groups . . . . Also 
called intelligent agent.  
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 19 (Microsoft Press 3d ed. 1997). 
 23. The definition of “push technology” is as follows:  
A data distribution technology in which selected data is automatically delivered into the user’s 
computer at prescribed intervals or based on some event that occurs. Contrast with pull 
technology, in which the user specifically asks for something by performing a search or requesting 
an existing report, video or other data type.  
ALLEN FREEDMAN, THE COMPUTER GLOSSARY : THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED 
DICTIONARY 335 (8th ed. 1998). The definition of “push” is as follows:  
[T]he process whereby the network delivers information to a client machine without waiting for 
the user to request it. Push technology makes the World Wide Web work rather like TV; the user 
selects a “channel” and views whatever is being sent out at the moment. This contrasts with the 
way web browsers traditionally work, where the user manually selects information to retrieve 
from the Web.  . . . Push technology is useful for delivering information that has to be updated 
minute by minute, such as stock market quotes or new bulletins.  
DOUGLAS A. DOWNING ET AL., DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET TERMS 378-79 
(6th ed. 1998). 
 24. Safier, supra note 6, ¶ 65. 
 25. The definition of “clickstream” is as follows: “[t]he trail of mouse clicks made by a user 
performing a particular operation on the computer. It often refers to linking from one page to another 
on the World Wide Web.” FREEDMAN, supra  note 23, at 63. Clickstream is also defined as follows: 
The path a user takes while browsing a Web site. Each distinct selection made on a Web page 
adds one click to the stream. The further down the clickstream the user goes without finding the 
sought item, the more likely he or she is to depart to another Web site. Analysis of usage pattern 
helps Web site designers create user-friendly site structures, links, and search facilities. 
COMPUTER DICTIONARY , supra  note 22, at  92. 
 26. See FED.  TRADE COMM’N,  PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE , Part II (2000) [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE] (describing how network 
advertising companies supply banner ads and gather data about consumers who view their ads through 
profiles linked to the identification number of the advertising network’s cookie on the consumer’s 
computer). Often, these “anonymous” profiles are merged with personally identifiable information 
collected through the traditional method of collecting personal data. Id. For a definition of “cookie,” 
see infra  note 27.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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when the user visits the site again in the future.27 In addition to collecting 
information that users do not voluntarily provide, such as the user’s e-mail 
address, the type of browser,28 the type of computer being used, and the 
Internet address (URL),29 Web sites use cookies to track clickstream data,30 
including surfing patterns, shopping habits and preferences, and purchasing 
power.31  
 
 
 27. The definition of “cookie” is as follows:  
On the World Wide Web, a block of data that a Web server stores on a client system. When a user 
returns to the same Web site, the browser sends a copy of the cookie back to the server. Cookies 
are used to identify users, to instruct the server to send a customized version of the requested Web 
page, to submit account information for the user, and for other administrative purposes. 
COMPUTER DICTIONARY , supra note 22, at 119. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 335 
(defining “cookie file” as “[a] file that contains information (cookies) created by Web sites 
that is stored on the user’s hard disk. It provides a way for the Web site to keep track of a 
user’s patterns and preferences and, with the cooperation of the Web browser, to store them 
on the user’s own hard disk in the COOKIES.TXT file”). A third definition of cookie is as 
follows:  
[I]formation stored on a user’s computer by a WEB BROWSER at the request of software at a 
Web site. Web sites use cookies to recognize users who have previously visited them. The next 
time the user accesses that site, the information in the cookie is sent back to the site so the 
information displayed can vary depending on the user’s preferences. The term cookie comes from 
a 1980s prank computer program called Cookie Monster that would interrupt users and demand 
that they type the word “cookie” before continuing. 
DOWNING ET AL ., supra note 23, at 106.  
 28. A “Web browser” is defined as follows:  
A client application that enables a user to view HTML documents on the World Wide Web, 
another network, or the user’s computer; follow the hyperlinks among them; and transfer files. 
Text-based Web browsers, such as Lynx, can serve users with shell accounts but show only the 
text elements of an HTML document; most Web browsers, however, require a connection that can 
handle IP packets but will also display graphics that are in the document, play audio and video 
files, and execute small programs . . . . In addition, most current Web browsers permit users to 
send and receive e-mail and to read and respond to newsgroups.  
COMPUTER DICTIONARY , supra note 22, at 505.  
 29. A “URL” (Uniform Resource Locator) is defined as follows: 
The address that defines the route to a file on the Web or any other Internet facility. URLs are 
typed into the browser to access Web pages, and URLs are embedded within the pages themselves 
to provide the hypertext links to other pages. The URL contains the protocol prefix, port address, 
domain name, subdirectory names and file name. Port addresses are generally default and are 
rarely specified. To access a home page on a Web site, only the protocol and domain name are 
required. For example, http://www.computerlanguage.com retrieves the home page at The 
Computer Language Company’s Web site. The http:// is the Web protocol, and 
www.computerlanguage.com is the domain name. 
FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 443. 
 30. For a definition of clickstream, see supra note 25. 
 31. See Michael Gartner, Report from the Ombudsman, BRILL’S CONTENT, Oct. 2000, at 26 
(describing a Web site that denied access if a user’s browser had been set to turn off cookies, thereby 
limiting a user’s choices to either no access to the Web site in order to prevent their online behavior 
from being tracked or access to the Web site in exchange for accepting cookies); Tim McDonald, Is 
Gen X Hooked on Cookies?, E-COMMERCE T IMES (Aug. 22, 2000), at http:// 
www.ecommercetimes.com/news/viewpoing2000/view-000822-1.shtml (equating cookies with labels 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/5
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C. The Discriminatory and Harmful Effects of the Online Collection and 
Use of Personal Information: Internal Secondary Uses and External 
Secondary Uses32 
1. Amazon.com: A Case of Price Discrimination? 
In September 2000, online shoppers in the DVD section of Amazon.com 
noticed that they were getting charged different prices for the same DVD 
item.33 Amazon claimed that its price variations were part of a random price 
test to examine the effects of price variations on buying habits.34 Consumers, 
journalists, and privacy advocates expressed skepticism that this price 
variation was random and alleged that Amazon was testing prices based on 
demographics,35 especially in light of Amazon’s announcement two weeks 
 
 
because Web sites can sell personal information acquired through the use of cookies to companies 
such as credit and insurance companies). 
 32. See PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26 (describing internal secondary uses as those in which 
the Web site engages and external secondary uses as those in which third parties engage). In the year 
2000, consumers sued various Web sites for allegedly collectin g and using personal information of 
users without notifying them or obtaining their consent or doing so in violation of the Web site 
operator’s privacy policy. Matthew P. Graven, Leave Me Alone, PC MAGAZINE, Jan. 16, 2001, at 158. 
Among these Web sites were: Amazon and Alexa Internet, a Web-navigation service provider owned 
by Amazon, sued in early 2000 for allegedly collecting personal information and sending it to Amazon 
without notifying consumers or obtaining their consent; e-tailer Buy.com, sued in March and April of 
2000 for allegedly sharing personal information with third party advertising services without notifying 
users or obtaining their consent; Quicken.com, a personal-finance site sued for collecting confidential 
personal data and sharing it with third parties in violation of its privacy policy; and RealNetworks, an 
online audio and video company, sued between late 1999 and early 2000 for allegedly tracking users’ 
online recording and listening habits in violation of its privacy policy. Id.  
 In addition, eGames, Inc., a developer and distributor of computer games, recently settled a suit 
that the Michigan Attorney General brought against the company. See Steven Bonisteel, Michigan 
Reaches Privacy Pact with eGames over ‘Spyware,’ NEWSBYTES (Jan. 12, 2001), at 
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/160454.html. EGames sells inexpensive games online and on 
CDs through retailers including Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target, and CompUSA. Id. Some of the company’s 
games install third-party software, called “spyware,” on consumers’ computers. Id. This spyware 
enabled an advertising company, Conducent, Inc., to interact with eGames’s users’ computers. Id. 
However, the Attorney General alleged that eGames had not adequately informed consumers of this 
spyware. Id. Moreover, the Attorney General alleged that eGames allowed third parties to track 
consumers’ browsing behavior at eGames’s Web site without notifying users. Id. In the settlement, 
eGames will remove the spyware from future games and online “demo” versions of its games, and it 
will post a privacy policy disclosing its information practices. Id. See also  Press Release, Chris De 
Witt, Attorney General: Jennifer M. Granholm (Jan. 10, 2001) (on file with author).  
 33. Keith Regan, Amazon’s Friendly Deception, E-COMMERCE T IMES (Sept. 18, 2000), at 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/viewpoint2000/view-000918-2.shtml.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Keith Dawson, Amazon Says ‘Oops’ to Keep the Press at Bay, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD 
(Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,18973,00.html (discussing 
another reporter’s theory that Internet retailers have the power to make dynamic pricing the norm in 
the future); Lori Enos, Amazon Apologizes for Pricing Blunder, E-COMMERCE T IMES (Sept. 28, 2000), 
at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/?id=4411 (describing consumer outrage at the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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prior to the price variation discovery that customers’ personal information 
(including past buying patterns and shopping preferences) was a business 
asset that could be shared with third parties.36  
Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges different prices to 
consumers for the same “commodity.”37 Examples of lawful price 
discrimination include charging children, adult, and senior citizens different 
prices for the same movie ticket or for admission to an amusement park; 
charging those who purchase a one-way versus a round-trip airline ticket 
different prices for the same ticket; and charging customers who have 
discount coupons less than those who do not.38 
However, price discrimination is not always lawful, particularly if it does 
not reflect the different costs of dealing with different buyers or if it does not 
result from a seller’s efforts to match a competitor’s prices.39 In the case of 
Amazon, loyal customers were charged higher prices than others, which does 
not reflect the lower cost of dealing with those who buy regularly from the 
online company.40 Moreover, the highest price a consumer is willing to pay 
for a particular commodity is easily revealed in cyberspace, because of the 
rampant use of technologies such as cookies.41 Therefore, the Internet readily 
facilitates forms of price discrimination.42 The Amazon case illustrates the 
 
 
difference in pricing); David Streitfield, On the Web, Price Tags Blur, WASH . POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at 
A1 (noting that the effects of dynamic testing in cyberspace are more detrimental to consumers than in 
real space). 
 36. Regan, supra  note 33. See also  Keith Regan, Amazon Announces Controversial Privacy 
Policy, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Sept. 1, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/4180.html 
(“Despite growing consumer fears about online privacy, Amazon.com . . . will notify its 23 million 
customers that it has revised its policy to reflect the fact that customer information may be sold as an 
asset.”). 
 37. See http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/discrim.htm. Price discrimination is also defined as 
“[t]he practice of charging different prices to different customers despite the cost of production being 
the same.” DONALD RUTHERFORD , DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 361 (1992). 
 38. Id. See also  THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 952-54 (1987) (describing 
price discrimination more thoroughly). 
 39. See http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/discrim.htm. 
 40. See Regan, supra note 33 (speculating that Amazon reasoned that “since customer X has 
made 10 purchases from Amazon in recent months—all single-item, apparent impulse buys—why not 
tack an extra dollar or two onto the prices that pop up on his Web page?”); Streitfield, supra  note 35 
(quoting customers who noted that Amazon’s alleged variable pricing was not going to earn customer 
loyalty). 
 41. Streitfield, supra note 35. Although store prices might vary from neighborhood to 
neighborhood, depending on the socioeconomic status of residents, price discrimination methods in 
real space “are sledgehammers compared with the Internet’s scalpel. The Web provides a continuous 
feedback loop . . . . It’s as if the corner drugstore could see you coming down the sidewalk, clutching 
your fevered brow, and then doubles the price of aspirin.” Id. 
 42. Interview with Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Cyberlaw, Stanford Law School, in St. Louis, 
Mo. (Nov. 1, 2000). See also Streitfield, supra note 35 (noting that the software company, 
BroadVision Inc., offers a Retail Commerce Suite, which it claims will allow any e-commerce retailer 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/5
p913 Daub.doc  2/28/2002   5:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] NEW STANDARD FOR PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION 921 
 
 
 
 
discriminatory effects of one possible internal secondary use of personal 
information collected online.  
2. Online Targeted Advertising and Direct Marketing: Discrimination 
of a Different Sort 
a. The Case of DoubleClick, Inc.43 
In January 2000, a California woman filed suit against DoubleClick, a 
major Web advertising firm that manages advertising for approximately 
1,500 Web sites,44 alleging that the company used cookies to identify Internet 
users and gather their personal information without their consent and in 
violation of its privacy policy.45 This suit arose one month after DoubleClick 
had acquired Abacus Direct, a direct marketing company that maintains a 
database on the purchasing power and consumer spending habits of 
Americans.46  
The plaintiff further alleged that DoubleClick combined its use of cookie 
technology with the information it acquired from Abacus Direct to build a 
more detailed profile of consumers, including their names; addresses; retail, 
catalog, and online purchase histories; and demographic data.47 With the 
acquisition of Abacus Direct, DoubleClick allegedly integrated its 
“anonymous” records of its consumers’ surfing habits using cookies with the 
Abacus database, creating the ability to identify its consumers.48 In addition 
to the California suit, the FTC launched an investigation into DoubleClick’s 
method of collecting and using the personal data of online consumers in mid-
February 2000.49 
 
 
to engage in price discrimination); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 155 
(1999) (“Economists will argue that in many contexts this ability to discriminate—in effect, to offer 
goods at different prices to different people—is overall a benefit . . . but these values are just one side 
of the equation. Weighed against them are the values of equality.”).  
 43. See Web site at www.doubleclick.com. 
 44. Paul A. Greenberg, FTC Launches Investigation into DoubleClick, E-COMMERCE T IMES 
(Feb. 17, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/2529.html. 
 45. Sandeep Junnarkar, DoubleClick Accused of Unlawful Consumer Data Use, CNET 
NEWS.COM (Jan. 28, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1534533.html. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Will Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick Double Cross, USATODAY.COM, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth211.htm (last modified June 7, 2000).  
 49. Chet Dembeck & Robert Conlin, Beleaguered DoubleClick Appoints Privacy Board, E-
COMMERCE  TIMES (May 17, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/3348.html. In 
January 2001, the FTC closed its investigation upon finding the following: 
Based on this investigation, it appears to staff that DoubleClick never used or disclosed 
consumers’  [personally identifiable information] for purposes other than those disclosed in its 
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b. FTC v. Toysmart.com50 
In July 2000, the FTC filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that 
Toysmart sold or shared personal information of its customers in breach of its 
privacy policy.51 The company’s privacy policy stated that personal customer 
information would never be shared with a third party.52 Nevertheless, the 
company placed information, including names, addresses, and credit card 
numbers, up for sale as part of its bankruptcy proceedings in order to settle its 
debts to creditors.53 Moreover, the company had a privacy seal of approval 
 
 
privacy policy. Specifically, it appears that DoubleClick did not combine [personally identifiable 
information] from Abacus Direct with clickstream collected on client Web sites. In addition, it 
appears that DoubleClick has not used sensitive data for any online preference marketing product, 
in contravention of its stated privacy policy. 
Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate Director, Division of Financial Practices, 
Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 22, 2001) (on file with author). 
 50. FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass. filed July 10, 2000). See also In 
re Toysmart.com LLC, No. 00-1395-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. filed June 9, 2000). 
 51. Paul A. Greenberg, Toysmart Flap Triggers Privacy Bill, E-COMMERCE TIMES (July 13, 
2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/3766.html. 
 52. Michelle Singletary, A Web of Broken Promises,  WASH . POST, July 16, 2000, at H1. The 
privacy policy stated: “Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as 
name, address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party.” Id. at 
H14. 
 53. Id. Another failed dot-com company, Living.com, was sued to prevent it from selling 
customer information in September 2000. Greg Sandoval, Texas Officials, Living.com Reach 
Settlement on Privacy, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 25, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-
2864965.html?tag=st.ne.ni.rnbot.rn.ni. The online furniture company reached an agreement with the 
Texas Attorney General to destroy customer financial information, including credit card, bank account, 
and social security information. Id. However, the agreement also gave Living.com permission to sell 
names and e-mail addresses, but only after notifying customers and giving them the choice to opt out. 
Id.  
 As more and more dot-coms go bankrupt, the issue posed in the Toysmart.com and Living.com 
cases—whether personal information linked to a privacy policy should be considered a company asset 
of the bankruptcy estate that may be sold without limitations—will arise more often. See generally 
Andrew B. Buxbaum & Louis A. Curcio, When You Can’t Sell to Your Customers, Try Selling Your 
Customers (But Not Under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 395 (2000) (arguing 
that bankruptcy law recognizes the enforceability of privacy policies in determining whether customer 
lists can be sold during bankruptcy proceedings); Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: 
Identifying, Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255, 300 (2000) (discussing how federal agencies and/or 
certifying agencies may ban the sale of customer lists during bankruptcy proceedings); Hal F. Morris 
& Flora A. Fearon, Texas Attorney General: Privacy Is Not for Sale, 2000 AM.  BANKR. INST. J. 1 
(Oct. 2000) (describing the conflict between the privacy rights of consumers and the business interests 
of creditors in determining whether the personal information of consumers constitutes a property 
interest of the debtor when it goes bankrupt). 
 Although § 541(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the property included in an estate, it does 
not define the scope of a debtor’s interest in property. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (2001). However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Butner v. United States suggests that if a dot-com did not have a property 
interest in a customer list containing personal information before bankruptcy, then it does not have one 
after filing. Bunter v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). In this case, the Supreme Court held that: 
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from TRUSTe.54 Toysmart agreed to a settlement, which forbids the sale of 
its customer information except under very limited circumstances.55 
c. FTC v. Geocities56 
In 1998, the FTC filed suit against GeoCities, which promised members 
that personal information would be shared with others to provide members 
 
 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a 
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property 
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage 
forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving “a windfall merely by reason of the 
happenstance of bankruptcy.” 
Id. at 55. 
 In addition, House Bill 833, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, requires that bankruptcy clerks 
release all public data held in electronic form to the public. Public L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, Title 
IV § 401(a) (1999). The benefits of such disclosure therefore conflict with individual privacy 
concerns. See Richard Lauter, Privacy Concerns and Safeguards in the Governmental Dissemination 
of Bankruptcy Data on the Internet,  2000 AMER. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (May 2000). 
  The Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Office of Management and 
Budget recently requested public comment regarding their study of how a consumer’s filing for 
bankruptcy relief affects the privacy of personal information. The FTC responded with a comment that 
addressed the privacy and identity theft concerns that the collection and use of personal information in 
personal bankruptcy cases. The comment suggested that agencies engage in the following: 
(a) “consider the extent to which highly sensitive information must be included in public record data; 
(b) prohibit the commercial use by trustees of debtors’ nonpublic data for purposes other than those for 
which the informat ion was collected; and (c) evaluate the interplay between consumer’s privacy 
interests and the Bankruptcy Code.” The Federal Trade Commission on “Recent Developments in 
Privacy Protections for Consumers” Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade and Consumer 
Protection of the Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission). See also  Public Comment on Financial Privacy and Bankruptcy, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 46,735 (July 31, 2000) (requesting public comment on financial privacy and bankruptcy). For the 
FTC staff comment, see http://www.ftc.gov/be/v000013.htm.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Web Site, Toysmart.com, 
Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (on file with author). Under the settlement agreement, Toysmart agreed to 
file an order in Bankruptcy Court, stating that it could sell the customer list only if it would be part of a 
package deal including the sale of the entire Web site to a “Qualified Buyer,” a company in a related 
market. Id. The Qualified Buyer must adhere to Toysmart’s privacy policy, and if it decides to change 
it, it must provide notice to consumers and obtain their affirmative consent. Id. The FTC has brought 
other law enforcement actions to protect privacy online. See also FTC v. Liberty Fin. Cos., Inc., FTC 
Dkt. No. C-3891 (filed Aug. 12, 1999) (challenging a Web site operator’s false representations that 
information collected from children in an online survey would be maintained anonymously); FTC v. 
Sandra Rennert et al., No. CV-S-00-0861-JBR (D. Nev. filed July 6, 2000) (involving an FTC 
settlement with an online pharmacies that allegedly collected consumers’ personal medical information 
without notifying consumers of their information practices settled with the FTC; FTC v. 
ReverseAuction.com, Inc. No. 00-0032 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 6, 2000) (in which online auction site that 
allegedly collected consumers’ personal information from a competitive site and sent deceptive, 
unsolicited e-mail spam to those consumers seeking their business). 
 56. FTC v. Geocities, FTC Dkt. No. C-3849 (filed Feb. 12, 1999). 
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with advertising they requested, but in reality the company was selling 
members’ information to third parties that used it for other purposes, 
including targeting members for advertising and solicitations beyond those 
that the member requested.57 The parties reached a settlement in which 
GeoCities agreed to post a clear and conspicuous privacy policy, informing 
users about what information is collected and for what purpose, to whom it 
will be disclosed, and how users can access their information and delete it.58 
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF ONLINE  
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
A. The Industry: Self -Regulation 
Despite the pending legislation in Congress that would regulate online 
privacy and the resistance of consumer and privacy advocates to new laws 
protecting the personal information of online shoppers, the current approach 
to solving the potential abuses of the collection and use of personal 
information on the Internet is self-regulation.59 In 1997, the Clinton 
Administration issued a report detailing a framework for global electronic 
commerce, known as the Magaziner Report, which stated that it supported 
self-regulation for the time being, but if consumer privacy was not 
sufficiently protected through self-policing, it would reconsider this 
approach.60 
As part of its endorsement of industry self-regulation, the FTC articulated 
“fair information practices” for Web sites to follow in its 1998 report entitled 
Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace.61 
First, consumers are entitled to clear notice of a Web site’s practice of 
collection and use of personal information.62 Second, consumers should be 
given choices as to how their information is used.63 For example, Web sites 
 
 
 57. Press Release, FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting 
Personal Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case  (Aug. 13, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm (on file with author). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH . L.J. 771, 775 (1999). 
 60. Id. 
 61. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26; Killingsworth, supra  note 10, at 69-72 (describing the 
FTC’s fair information practices principles). 
 62. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra  note 26, at 4. To give notice, “data collectors must disclose their 
information practices before collecting personal information from consumers.” Id. at 4. 
 63. Id. To qualify as offering choices, “consumers must be given options with respect to whether 
and how personal information collected from them may be used for purposes beyond those for which 
the information was provided.” Id. 
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should allow consumers to “opt-in” to allow use of information beyond the 
purpose for which it was first provided or “opt-out” to not allow such use.64 
Third, consumers should have reasonable access to their personal 
information. 65 Fourth, Web sites should protect the security of consumers’ 
personal information. 66 The FTC also identified enforcement as an important 
element of a self-regulation program.67  
In an effort to seek compliance with these principles, two self-regulatory 
initiatives, TRUSTe and BBBOnLine, were launched. TRUSTe grants 
licenses to Web sites to use a special logo indicating the Web site has a 
privacy policy and that it follows certain fair information practices.68 
TRUSTe may conduct audits to evaluate compliance with the companies’ 
privacy policies.69 BBBOnLine is a project of the Better Business Bureau.70 
Its goal is to provide an enforcement mechanism for privacy disputes that 
occur online.71 
Moreover, various coalitions of electronic retailers and advertisers have 
recently developed self-regulation plans, which have included efforts to 
enforce standards for consumer privacy.72 For example, the FTC and the 
Department of Commerce endorsed an industry self-regulation plan that the 
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) developed in July 2000.73 The NAI 
 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. To qualify as offering access, “consumer should be able to view and contest the accuracy 
and completeness of data collected about them.” Id. 
 66. Id. To give security, “data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure that information 
collected from consumers is accurate and secure from unauthorized use.” Id. 
 67. Id. The FTC defines enforcement as “the use of a reliable mechanism to impose sanctions for 
noncompliance with these fair information practices.” Id. 
 68. See Reidenberg, supra  note 59, at 777. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 778. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Rob Garretson, Electronic Retailers Plan Self-Regulation, WASH . POST, July 19, 2000, at 
E3 (“[T]he Electronic Retailing Association outlined a series of steps it plans to take to combat online 
fraud and violations of its privacy guidelines, which will include expelling offenders from the 
association . . . publicizing the offenses.” The Electronic Retailing Association (ERA) is a trade group 
representing 479 retailers that sell their products on television, radio, and the Internet. Id. See also 
John Schwartz, Online Firm Plan Retail Guidelines, WASH . POST, June 6, 2000, at E1 (describing the 
proposal adopted by the seven-company coalition, including America Online, AT&T, Dell, IBM, and 
Microsoft, calling for consumer protection guidelines).   
 73. Chet Dembeck & Jennifer Hampton, FTC Backs Away from Net Privacy Regulation , E-
COMMERCE T IMES (July 28, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/000728-
5.shtml. In November 1999, the FTC and the Department of Commerce held a public workshop on the 
practice of online profiling, in which third-party network advertisers engage, in  order to educate the 
public about the practice and to evaluate the industry’s efforts to implement the FTC’s fair information 
practice principles. The Federal Trade Commission on “Recent Developments in Privacy Protections 
for Consumers” Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade and Consumer Protection of the 
Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade 
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constitutes about ninety percent of the network advertising market.74  
Finally, the NAI developed the Self-Regulatory Principles for Online 
Preference Marketing (OPM).75 Under this agreement, advertisers will 
display notices on Web sites about when and how they are collecting 
personal information from users, and users will have the right to opt out.76 
Consumers will also be given access to their own personal information.77 In 
addition, NAI companies agreed not to use consumers’ medical or financial 
information for marketing purposes and not to use Social Security numbers 
or gender for profiling.78  
B. Congress: Pending Legislation 
Although the current trend is self-regulation, several pending bills in 
Congress reflect many legislators’ support for federal regulation to protect 
the online consumer privacy of personal information. 79 The Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation concluded hearings 
in early October 2000 on two bills: the Consumer Internet Privacy 
Enhancement Act80 and the Consumer Privacy Protection Act.81  
 
 
Commission). After the workshop, the NAI companies submitted drafts of self-regulatory principles to 
the FTC and the Department of Commerce. Id. In July 2000, the two agencies endorsed the NAI’s 
plan. Id. 
 74. Dembeck & Hampton, supra note 73. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. In addition to self-regulatory initiatives such as TRUSTe, BBBOnline, and the self-
regulatory plans of various coalitions, Internet, software, and computer companies increasingly engage 
in the practice of hiring privacy officers. Erich Luening, EarthLink Boosts Privacy Efforts with New 
Exec, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 13, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4132109.html. For 
example, Earthlink, an Internet service provider for approximately 4.6 million subscribers named Les 
Seagraves as its chief privacy officer in December 2000 in order to protect customers’ personal 
information. Id. Among his tasks will be to revise the company’s privacy policy and lead a privacy 
council composed of EarthLink employees. Id. 
 In November 2000, IBM chose Harriet P. Pearson to be its chief privacy officer to “articulate and 
develop its privacy policy for employees and customers” and “to work with software and technology 
groups to ensure that all parties adhere to IBM’s privacy standards.” Id. See also Erich Luening, 
Privacy Officers Get a Seat in Executive Boardrooms, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 11, 2000), at 
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-4065560.html?tag=st.ne.ni.rnbot.rn.ni.  
 Legislative proposals have also been introduced to establish a government-wide chief information 
officer (CIO) to manage information and technology policies. Erich Luening,  Washington Debates 
Need for Technology Policy Chief, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 12, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/ 
0-1007-200-2762382.html?tag=st.ne.ni.rnbot.rn.ni. 
 79. For an excellent compilation of e-commerce legislation, see http://www.bmck.com/ 
ecommerce/congress.htm. 
 80. S. 2928, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 81. S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000). In addition to these two bills, Congressman Frelinghuysen, a 
Republican from New Jersey, recently introduced House Bill 89 on January 3, 2001, the first online 
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1. The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act82 
The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act83 has a Republican 
sponsor, two Democratic co-sponsors, and one Republican co-sponsor.84 The 
Act essentially codifies the FTC’s fair information practice principles of 
 
 
privacy bill introduced in 107th Congress. H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill would require the 
FTC to draft regulations to protect the online privacy of personal information collected from users 
whom the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) does not cover. H.R. 89, § 502. 
COPPA protects children under 12 and makes it “unlawful for an operator of a website or online 
service directed to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal 
information from a child, to collect personal information from a child in a manner that violates the 
regulations prescribed.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2000). House Bill 89 has been referred to the House 
Committee on Commerce. See also  Robert MacMillan, ISP Shield Bill, House Tech Measures Debut, 
NEWSBYTES (Jan. 4, 2001), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/160051.html. 
 In a speech, the Chairman of the Senate Democratic Privacy Task Force, Senator Leahy, 
summarized the “failure” of the 106th Congress to address the privacy rights of Americans. 146 CONG. 
REC. S11,777 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2000). He cited the Democratic Senators who have sponsored 
privacy legislation in Congress: Senators Boxer, Breaux, Bryan, Byrd, Cleland, Daschle, Dorgan, 
Dodd, Durbin, Edwards, Feinstein, Feingold, Harkin, Hollings, Inouye, Johnson, Kennedy, Kohl, 
Lautenberg, Mikulski, Murray, Robb, Rockefeller, Sarbanes, Schumer, Torricelli, and Wellstone. Id. 
 However, he named the Republican majority responsible for the failure to get any privacy 
legislation enacted, particularly in the areas of online medical and financial information. Id. More 
specifically, Leahy described his proposed bill, the Electronic Rights for the 21st Century Act, Senate 
Bill 854, as an example of legislation that went “nowhere.” Id. at S11,778. This bill would have 
prevented disclosure of internet service providers’ subscriber information without their permission. Id. 
 In his speech, Leahy also described the failed effort of various bills that aimed to protect financial 
and medical information. Id. For example, the Financial Information Privacy and Security Act of 1999, 
Senate Bill 1924, would have provided privacy protection for personal financial information by 
codifying the principles of notice, accuracy, and consent. Id. The Financial Information Privacy 
Protection Act of 2000, Senate Bill 2513, which the Clinton Administration proposed, would have 
given consumer[s] more control over the collection and use of their financial and health-related 
information by financial institutions. Id. at S11,779. 
 In addition to financial privacy bills, he described how various bills that aimed to protect the 
privacy of medical records also failed. Id. Among these proposals were, first, Senate Bill 573, the 
Medical Information Privacy and Security Act, which would ensure the protection of personally 
identifiable health information and, second, an amendment to the FY 2001 Labor HHS Appropriations 
bill to prevent insurance companies and employers from using personal genetic information to 
discriminate against individuals or raise their insurance rates. Id. 
 Leahy concluded with his ambitions for the 107th Congress: 
It is my hope that we put partisan politics aside in the 107th Congress and take a hard look at how 
we can and should protect the fundamental right of privacy in the 21st Century. As each day 
passes, new financial services, new online services, and new medical data bases are taking shape 
and institutional practices employing these new technologies are taking root. Unless we decide 
that privacy is worth protecting—and soon—the erosion of our privacy rights will become 
irreversible. 
Id. 
 82. S. 2928, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. The Republican sponsor is Senator McCain; the Democratic co-sponsors are Senator 
Boxer from California and Senator Kerry from Massachusetts. The Republican co-sponsor is Senator 
Abraham from Michigan. Id. 
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notice, consent, security, and enforcement, although it does not specifically 
enumerate them as such.85  
The bill devotes an entire subsection to describing the requirements for a 
Web site’s statement on notice.86 This subsection requires that Web sites 
notify consumers of the ways users may choose not to have their personal 
information used, thereby adopting an opt-out standard.87 The FTC would be 
responsible for enforcement of the Act, and violations would be treated as 
violations of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive trade practice.88 The 
relevant sentence of Section 5 of the FTC Act reads as follows: “Unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”89 Guided 
by case law, the FTC has identified the following three factors that it 
considers when applying the prohibition against consumer unfairness: 
(1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it violates established 
public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous.90 The Supreme 
Court quoted these factors with approval in the 1972 case of Sperry v. 
Hutchinson.91 Since then, the Commission has continued to refine the 
standard of unfairness in its cases and rules.92 
 
 
 85. See id. (a bill “to protect the privacy of consumers who use the Internet”). 
 86. Senate Bill 2928 section 2(b)(1) states the following: 
In general . . . notice consists of a statement that informs a user of a website of the following: 
 (A) The identity of the operator of the website and of any third party the operator knowingly 
permits to collect personally identifiable information from users through the website . . . .  
 (B) A list of the types of personally identifiable information that may be collected online . . . . 
 (C) A description of how the operator uses such information, including a statement as to 
whether the information may be sold, distributed, disclosed, or otherwise made available to third 
parties for marketing purposes. 
 (D) A description of the categories of potential recipients of any such personally identifiable 
information. 
 (E) Whether the user is required to provide personally identifiable information in order to use 
the website . . . .  
 (F) A general description of what steps the operator takes to protect the security of personally 
identifiable information collected online . . . . 
 (G) A description of the means by which a user may elect not to have the user’s personally 
identifiable information used by the operator for marketing purposes or sold, distributed, 
disclosed, or otherwise made available to a third party . . . . 
Id. 
 87. Id. § 2(b)(1)(G). 
 88. Id. § 3. 
 89. 15 U.S.C. 45(1)(1) (1994). 
 90. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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2. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act93 
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act94 has a Democratic sponsor, ten 
Democratic co-sponsors, and no Republican co-sponsors.95 The bill lists 
various congressional findings including the following: industry self-
regulation schemes, which are not enforceable, do not provide sufficient 
consumer protection; establishing personal privacy rights and industry 
obligations is important in order to boost consumer confidence in the 
Internet; and the ease of collecting and using personal information on the 
Internet is becoming increasingly efficient and easy.96 The bill attempts to 
regulate online consumer privacy of personal information,97 as well as 
individual privacy in the offline marketplace for consumers of books and 
recorded music98 and for subscribers of satellite television services.99  
The online privacy section of the bill (Title I) more or less codifies the 
notice, consent, access, and security requirements of the FTC’s fair 
information practice principles.100 It requires that Web sites obtain a user’s 
 
 
 93. S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. The Democratic sponsor is Senator Hollings from South Carolina. The ten Democratic co-
sponsors are: Senator Breaux from Louisiana, Senator Cleland from Georgia, Senator Feingold from 
Wisconsin, Senator Rockefeller from West Virginia, Senator Bryan from Nevada, Senator Durbin 
from Illinois, Senator Inouye from Hawaii, Senator Byrd from West Virginia, Senator Edwards from 
North Carolina, and Senator Kerrey from Nebraska. 
 96. Id. § 2. 
 97. Id. at tit. I. 
 98. Id. at tit. II. 
 99. Id. at tit. IV. 
 100. S. 2606 tit. I, § 102 (2000), states the following:  
(a) Notice.—An Internet service provider, online service provider, or operator of a commercial 
website may not collect personally identifiable information from a user of that service or website 
unless that provider or operator gives clear and conspicuous notice in a manner reasonably 
calculated to provide actual notice to any user . . . that personally identifiable information may be 
collected from that user. The notice sh all disclose— 
 (1) the specific information that will be collected; 
 (2) the methods of collecting and using the information collected; and 
 (3) all disclosure practices of that provider or operator for personally identifiable information 
so collected, including whether it will be disclosed to third parties. 
(b) Consent.—An Internet service provider, online service provider, or operator of a commercial 
website may not— 
 (1) collect personally identifiable information from a user of that service or website, or 
 (2)  . . . disclose or otherwise use such information about a user of that service or website, 
unless the provider or operator obtains that user’s affirmative consent, in advance, to the collection 
and disclosure or use of that information. 
(c) Access. —An Internet service provider, online service provider, or operator of a commercial 
website shall— 
 (1) upon request provide reasonable access to a user to personally identifiable information 
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“affirmative consent” prior to collecting or using personal information, which 
is the equivalent of adopting an opt-in standard.101 The FTC would enforce 
the Act, treating violations as unfair or deceptive trade practices.102  
C. The FTC: Self -Regulation and Federal Regulation 
Since 1995, the FTC has been investigating online privacy issues, in part 
through the use of privacy surveys.103 In its 1998 and 1999 reports to 
Congress, the Commission described the fair information practice principles 
and called for industry efforts to implement them.104  
However, based on the results of its 2000 Survey, which examined the 
information practices of a large number of U.S. commercial sites on the 
World Wide Web, the FTC decided to expand its recommendation to include 
the enactment of legislation to ensure the protection of online consumer 
privacy.105 While praising industry self-regulatory initiatives and 
encouraging the industry to continue them in its May 2000 report to 
Congress, the Commission concluded that self-regulation was insufficient.106 
 
 
that the provider or operator has collected . . .  
 (2) provide a reasonable opportunity for a user to correct, delete, or supplement any such 
information . . . and 
 (3) make the correction or supplementary information a part of that user’s personally 
identifiable information for all future disclosure . . .  
(d) Security.—An Internet service provider, online 
service provider, or operator of a commercial website shall establish and maintain reasonable 
procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally 
identifiable information maintained by that provider or operator . . . . 
Id. at tit. I, § 102. 
 101. Id. § 102(b)(2). 
 102. Id. at tit. III, § 302(a).  
 103. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26. See generally  Roscoe B. Starek, III & Lynda M. Rozell, A 
Cyberspace Persp ective: The Federal Trade Commission’s Commitment to On-line Consumer 
Protection, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO . L. 679 (1997) (describing the FTC’s commitment 
to enforcement of its consumer protection statutes online). 
 104. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26. 
 105. Id. at 36. 
 106. Id. at ii. The FTC’s 2000 Survey examined two groups of Web sites: (1) a random sample of 
335 Web sites and (2) 91 of the 100 business sites. Id. The results show that 97% of the random sites 
and 99% of the busiest sites collect an e-mail address or some other piece of personal identifying 
information. Id. In addition, the survey found that only 20% of the random sites and 42% of the busiest 
sites implement, at least in part, all four fair information practice principles. Id. Moreover, while most 
sites allow the placement of cookies by third parties, the majority of sites do not disclose this fact to 
consumers. Id. at 7. 
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The FTC’s proposed legislation would codify the fair information practice 
principles and give an implementing agency the authority to promulgate 
more detailed rules and enforce them.107 
D. Other Approaches 
1. The European Rights-Based Approach 
Many advocates of online consumer privacy regulation recommend that 
the United States follow the lead of European Union (EU) countries, many of 
which have adopted comprehensive privacy and data protection laws.108 The 
EU enacted two directives providing citizens with protections from abuses of 
personal information and required each EU state to enact analogous 
legislation.109  
The European Telecommunications Directive and the European Data 
Protection Directive, enacted in 1998, set forth the privacy rights of 
consumers.110 These rights include: the right to know where the data 
originated, the right to have inaccurate data changed, the right to recourse if 
unlawful data processing occurs, and the right to opt-out of allowing the use 
of the data.111 Under these directives, every EU country will have a Privacy 
Commissioner or agency that enforces these rights.112 Furthermore, the 
directives prohibit the collection and use of personal information about EU 
citizens outside of the EU to countries that are not in compliance with EU 
privacy protection laws.113 
2. Market-Based Approaches 
On the other side of the spectrum are those who oppose any regulation of 
cyberspace.114 The proponents of a market-based approach believe that 
regulation leads to inefficiency and prevents the growth of online commerce,
 
 
 107. Id. at 36. 
 108. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International 
Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments,  18 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 10-13 (1999). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
 112. Id. 
 113. David Bender & Danice M. Kowalczyk, Avoiding Intellectual Trespass in the Global 
Marketplace: Encryption & Privacy in E-Commerce, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symp2000/v5i1a2-Bender_kowalczyk.html. 
 114. See generally Safier, supra note 6, ¶ 124. 
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the growth of the direct marketing industry, and the development of 
cyberspace.115  
The “privacy market opportunists” support the development of markets in 
personal data through the transfer of ownership or property rights in personal 
data from those who collect data off a Web site to the data subjects 
themselves.116 For example, consumers conducting transactions online with 
Web sites would exchange their information for money or credit for other 
online goods and services.117  
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has also developed a market-
based approach called the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a project 
that enables the marketplace to give users more control over their personal 
information. 118 P3P involves the development and delivery of software tools 
and services that give users knowledge of Web sites’ information 
practices.119 After users have selected their privacy preferences in their 
browser, it will only enter Web sites that have privacy policies that meet 
these preferences.120  
A third market-based approach is simply to use specific software 
programs to prevent Web sites from collecting and using personal data.121 
For example, software programs such as anonymous browsing services keep 
your identity concealed,122 while cookie managers identify and block specific 
 
 
 115. Id. ¶¶ 124-26. 
 116. Belgum, supra  note 10, ¶¶ 39-54.  
 117. Id. ¶ 43. See also Pamela Samuelson, Book Review: A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses 
of Personal Data in the Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REV. 751 (1999) (discussing how 
economists recommend granting property right to individuals in their personal information to solve the 
data privacy problem). 
 118. Online Privacy: Hearing Before the US Senate Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) 
(statement of Daniel J. Weitzner, Technology and Society Domain Leader, World Wide Web 
Consortium), available at http://www.w3.org/2000/05/25-Senate-Privacy-Testimony.html. See also 
Safier, supra  note 6, at 28-30. 
 119. Id. See also  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 478-80 (2000).  
 120. Id. The author describes this result of P3P as “machine-to machine communication and 
possibly, negotiation, without a person getting involved at either end.” Id. at 479. 
 121. For a comprehensive review of software products that thwart the online collection of personal 
information, see Graven, supra note 32, at 153.  
 122. Anonymous browsing services offer a wide variety of levels of security, convenience, and 
cost. Id. at 152-55. For example, some retrieve pages from remote sites and send them to your browser 
without revealing your identity. However, they do not conceal the page itself or your URL from your 
network administrator (see infra  note 29 for a definition of URL). Id. at 152-55. Other anonymous 
browsing services conceal URLs from your Internet Service Provider (ISP) or network administrator, 
but don’t protect the content of the pages you viewed. Id. Services that provide the tightest security 
actually encrypt the URL and page data. Id. Some encrypt only HTTP data, while others encrypt data 
transferred through FTP, like a software download. Id. 
 The following are anonymous browsing services: SafeWeb (www.safeweb.com) encrypts all 
HTTP data and is free; IDzap (www.idzap.com) conceals your identity from remote sites through 
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types of cookies.123  
3. An Approach Combining Law and Technology 
Another proposed solution to the problem of online profiling of personal 
information combines support for the development of technology such as 
P3P with government backing of this technology.124 This solution entails the 
government supporting a property regime in which individuals’ personal 
information is viewed as property over which they have control, and before it 
can be transferred or taken, negotiation must take place.125 
4. Common Law Tort Protection 
Another approach to protecting online personal information is to sue 
transgressors for violating the common law tort doctrine of invasion of 
privacy.126 In a famous law review article, Samuel D. Warren and Louis 
Brandeis define the right to a zone of privacy, including “the right to be let 
alone,” that would protect against private party intrusion.127 Professor 
 
 
IDzap’s servers, which act as a proxy between a user’s PC and the remote site; IDsecure, which costs 
$15 every three months or $50 a year, encrypts all traffic to and from a user’s PC and supports all 
browsers but only HTTP protocol; Anonymizer.com offers various packages, including a basic free 
proxy-style service and a more secure service for $14.99 every three months, which can encrypt 
cookies and URLs but not the content of data; Subdimension (www.subdimension.com), a free service 
that conceals URLs, but not page titles; Zero-Knowledge System’s Freedom (www.zeroknowledge. 
com) is $49.95 per year for five anonymous identities, provides an encrypted connection, and allows a 
user to browse using an anonymous identity; and Privada-Control (www.privada.com) is $5 a month 
and installs an application on a user’s PC that directs Web traffic to and from a user’s browser through 
Privada’s servers, thereby concealing a user’s identity. Id. at 152-55. 
 123. Cookies either engage in user profiling, “monitor a Web site’s usability,” or track a user’s 
surfing habits. Id. at 157. Some cookie management programs can target specific kinds of cookies and 
block them. Id. at 158. 
 The following are cookie managers: McAfee Internet Privacy Service (www.mcafee-at-
home.com) and Symantec’s Norton Internet Security 2001 block all advertiser cookies and create lists 
of sites from which a user can decide to accept or reject cookies for $69.95 a year and $71.35 a year 
respectively; IDcide’s Privacy Companions (www.idcide.com), which can be downloaded for free, 
blocks cookies that track users’ surfing habits and notifies users when sites attempt to gather such 
information; Limit Software’s Cookie Crusher 2.6 (www.thelimitsoft.com) and Kookaburra 
Software’s Cookie Pal (www.kburra.com), which cost $15 each, let a user view the Web site issuing 
the cookie and allow a user to set preferences for accepting or rejecting cookies from sites. Id. at 157-
58. 
 124. Lessig, supra note 42, at 159-62. 
 125. Id. Cf. Mark Rotenberg, What Larry Doesn't Get: Fair Information Practices and the 
Architecture of Privacy, 2001 STAN. TECH . L. REV. 1 (forthcoming), available at http://stlr.stanford. 
edu/stlr/articles/o1_stlr_1/index.htm. 
 126. Safier, supra  note 6, ¶ 101. 
 127. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890). 
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William Prosser has divided the common law tort doctrine of invasion of 
privacy into four categories: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) the public disclosure of private facts; 
(3) false light privacy; and (4) the misappropriation of one’s name and 
likeness for commercial purposes.128  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The purpose of many of the FTC lawsuits discussed in Part I was to 
address the unfairness of misrepresenting the degree to which these online 
companies were protecting the privacy of their customers’ personal 
information. 129 A major consequence of such misrepresentation is that 
consumers are not only unaware that they are being profiled, they are 
unaware of the purposes and effects of being profiled.130 For example, 
DoubleClick’s profiling activities would have boosted its “targeted” online 
advertisements (and those of the third party to which they were sold in the 
case of Geocities).131 Additionally, DoubleClick (and Toysmart) could have 
sold the information to direct marketers, health organizations, insurance 
companies, credit agencies, or other third parties desiring the information.132  
Targeted advertising and direct marketing based on the profiling of online 
personal information can lead to discrimination. 133 While targeted advertising 
may be viewed as positive discrimination by feeding a consumer his or her 
own preferences,134 it also has adverse discriminatory and harmful effects.135 
 
 
 128. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 129. Killingsworth, supra note 10, at 60-61; Greenberg, supra  note 44; Singletary, supra note 52. 
 130. See generally OSCAR H. GANDY,  JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 207-08 (1993). 
 131. Greenberg, supra note 44. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See GANDY, supra note 130, at 80-81 (“The panoptic sort, which depends on ready access to 
personal information . . . is . . . a discriminatory technology”); Gandy, supra  note 9, at 78-79 
(“[I]nformation about our status, choices, and communication behavior often forms the basis for 
differentiation, and such difference forms the basis for discrimination . . . . my concern about . . . 
privacy in cyberspace is fundamentally a concern with discrimination.”). See also Belgum, supra  note 
10, ¶ 31 (“Statistically-generated profiles may mask old-fashioned race prejudice or other illicit biases 
which are explicitly ruled out of order on grounds of public policy”). 
 134. See LESSIG, supra  note 42, at 153 (“[P]roducts are matched to people, and interests to people 
. . . . This is discrimination, no doubt, but not the discrimination of Jim Crow. It is the wonderful sort 
of discrimination that spares me Nike ads.”). Despite the convenience and appeal of such 
personalization, any Web user with a basic amount of technical skill can seek his or her own interests 
resources on his or her own, without having any personal data collected.  
 135. Id. at 154-56.  
[P]rofiling raises a more sustained collective concern about how it might affect a community. That 
concern is about manipulation . . . . The system watches what you . . . it fits you into a pattern . . . . 
A second concern is about equality . . . . An efficient and effective system for monitoring makes it 
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For example, poorer sectors of the population can be excluded and 
underrepresented in such advertising campaigns because they are based on 
past purchasing patterns.136 In addition, companies may decide not to solicit 
or offer promotions to particular individuals because their profiles categorize 
them with others who might be credit risks or have lower estimated customer 
potential, effectively denying them access to particular products or 
services.137 
 
 
possible . . . to make these subtle distinctions of rank. 
Id. 
 136. See Gandy, supra note 9, at 89-91. 
 137. See GANDY, supra note 130, at 130. In Lake v. Kozmo.com Inc., No. 00-00815, plaintiffs 
alleged that a dot-com was engaging in “online redlining” by not delivering to predominantly African-
American neighborhoods (based on zip code) in Washington, D.C. Id. This case deals with the issue of 
substantive discrimination, rather than the discriminatory effects of online profiling (the plaintiffs 
knew why Kozmo.com first asked users for their zip code on its Web site—to determine whether it 
delivers there) and is therefore distinguishable. Id. Nevertheless, the case provides an idea of the kind 
of discrimination that could potentially result from the online collection and use of personal 
information. See Kate Marquess, Redline May Be Going Online, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 80; Kenneth 
Li & Bernhard Warner, Bad Timing for Kozmo.com’s Bad Press,  THE INDUSTRY STANDARD (Apr. 14, 
2000), available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,14163,00.html; Michelle 
Goldberg, Racial Redlining at Kozmo.com?, T HE INDUSTRY STANDARD (Apr. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,14120,00.html. On December 5, 2000, Kozmo 
settled with the Equal Rights Center for $125,000, which will go toward “bridging the digital divide.” 
In addition, Kozmo recently began service in several new D.C. zip codes. Kozmo Settles, THE LEGAL 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 3. 
 Businesses can use zip codes to determine where consumers live in order to engage in targeted 
marketing. For example, an online business selling airline tickets might target the users on surf.com 
who live in Hawaii in order to offer them special flight deals to surf competitions on the islands. 
Online marketing and targeted advertising, however, can be difficult to distinguish from redlining.  
 In addition to redlining based on zip codes, businesses engage in this practice when they choose 
not to sell or market their products to consumers, or hire individuals, based on other demographic 
information such as race or income, genetic information, and other financial or medical information. 
This information can be collected traditionally in real space or online in cyberspace.  
For example, businesses could recognize zip codes from low-income areas and choose not to 
advertise to these groups or could make decisions about an individual’s insurance policy based on 
information they collect about them on the Internet. These types of discriminatory uses of 
individuals’ personal information would limit autonomy. 
See Basho, supra note 1, at 1544. 
 A hypothetical situation of redlining by an auto insurance company would be if it rated customers 
by the zip code in which they reside. MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 223 (2d ed. 1998). This redlining may be evident in the fact that insurance in 
some neighborhoods is more expensive or less available than in other neighborhoods. Id.  
 Another example of the kind of discrimination that may result from a lack of online privacy is that 
which is based on sensitive health information about an individual that may be directly collected on 
the Internet, or inferred from a user’s online surfing habits or clickstream data. For example, the 
human genome project has facilitated genetic discrimination since the knowledge gained from the 
project will allow physicians to detect more diseases and predispositions for diseases through a range 
of genetic tests. As a result, more information about an individual’s medical background will be 
available and the demand for such information will extend to employers, health and life insurers, and 
law enforcement agencies. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,  AMERICAN MEDICAL 
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A. Self -Regulation 
The e-commerce industry’s efforts to govern the online collection and use 
of personal information among its own ranks are evident in improved 
statistics regarding privacy initiatives.138 In its 1998 Report, the FTC reported 
that although 92% of the Web sites surveyed in a random sample were 
collecting “great amounts” of personal information from consumers, only 
14% of them disclosed anything at all about their information practices.139 In 
contrast, its 2000 Survey results showed that 88% of the Web sites surveyed 
in a random sample posted at least one privacy disclosure.140 Moreover, the 
industry has developed online seal programs to enforce certain fair 
information practice principles.141 Notwithstanding these improvements, 
industry self-regulation remains insufficient to protect online consumer 
privacy for several reasons.  
First, the self-regulatory programs are not broad-based or widespread 
enough.142 In the FTC’s 2000 Survey, only 20% of the Web sites in a random 
sample implement to some extent all four fair information practices in their 
privacy policy disclosures.143 In addition, only 41% meet the standards for 
notice and choice.144 Finally, the entire industry does not comply with self-
regulation initiatives.145 For example, only 90% of the network advertising 
 
 
ASSOCIATION, Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, JAMA, Oct. 2, 1991, at 1827.  
 In a study that was part of the Human Genome Education Model (HuGEM) Project of the 
Georgetown University Child Development Center and the Alliance of Genetic Support Groups 
conducted in 1996, the following findings were made: in a survey of 332 members of genetic support 
groups with one or more of 101 different genetic disorders in the family, 25% of the respondents or 
affected family members believed they were denied life insurance; 22% believed they were denied 
health insurance; and 13% believed they were terminated from employment. E. Virginia Lapham et al., 
Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, SCIENCE, Oct. 25, 1996, at 621. In addition, fear 
of discrimination based on genetic information resulted in 18% not revealing such information to 
insurers and 17% not informing their employers of such information. Id.  
 For general background on genetic discrimination, see Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic 
Information and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, SCIENCE, Mar. 21, 
1997, at 1755; Marvin R. Natowicz, Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 465 
(1992); Lisa N. Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: 
Case Study Analysis, 2 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 71 (1996). I would like to express my gratitude to 
Professor Pauline Kim, Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law, who provided me 
with these articles on genetic discrimination. 
 138. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26. 
 139. Id. at i. 
 140. Id. at ii. 
 141. See Reidenberg, supra  note 59, at 778. 
 142. See PRIVACY ONLINE, supra  note 26. 
 143. Id. at 13. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. See also Dembeck & Hampton, supra note 73. 
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industry is a member of the Network Advertising Initiative.146 Thus, the 
remaining 10% can only be compelled to adhere to the fair information 
practice principles through legislation. 147  
Secondly, self-regulation has not resulted in large-scale enforcement of 
the implementation of fair information principles.148 While the online privacy 
seal programs have been adopted, and the number of sites enrolled in these 
programs has increased over the last year, they still have not established a 
widespread presence.149 The FTC’s 2000 Survey showed that only 8% of 
Web sites in a random sample display a privacy seal.150 Moreover, as 
discussed in Part II many companies that have privacy policies or seals, 
including Amazon, Doubleclick, Toysmart, and Geocities, have changed or 
breached their policies. Furthermore, TRUSTe, one of the major online 
privacy seal programs discussed in Part II.A, was recently caught violating 
its own privacy policy in August 2000 through the use of a third-party 
software program.151  
Third, self-imposed limits by the industry on online collection of certain 
kinds of “sensitive” personal information, such as their financial background 
or medical history, is an ineffective method of protecting online consumer 
privacy.152 Web site operators and third parties, such as network advertisers, 
can gather similar information, such as online shopping habits, through 
tracking a user’s clickstream, from which they can infer sensitive personal 
information. 153  
 
 
 146. Dembeck & Hampton, supra note 73. 
 147. Id. 
 148. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 26, at ii. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Keith Regan, TRUSTe Stung by Own Privacy Gaffe, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Aug. 25, 2000), at 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/000825-3.shtml.  
 152. See Dembeck & Hampton, supra note 73 (noting that NAI companies agreed not to use 
consumers’ medical or financial information for marketing purposes and not to use Social Security 
numbers or gender for profiling).   
 153. See GANDY, supra note 130, at 200. The author discusses Richard Posner’s analysis of 
privacy rights: 
Posner concludes, with some insight, that the ban on discrimination by race or gender will have 
little effect so long as those who wish to discriminate can identify correlates of race and gender 
that predict mean performance just as well. It is this insight, that the panoptic sort is capable of 
finding analogues or indexes that serve the same funct ion as more politically or socially sensitive 
indicators, that weakens the long-term utility of any definition of classes of information as being 
more or less sensitive. 
Id.  
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B. Pending Legislation 
Pending legislation would at least ensure a baseline of online consumer 
privacy protection, which self-regulation is currently failing to do. Among 
the concerns with online profiles that the Consumer Internet Privacy 
Enhancement Act and the Consumer Privacy Protection Act do address, 
through essentially a codification of some of the fair information practice 
principles, are the following: the general invasion of privacy or loss of 
control over personal information; receiving undesirable solicitations or junk 
mail; and the existence of false or inaccurate information in profiles.154  
However, a major negative consequence of online profiling that pending 
legislation does not address is the potential for adverse discrimination.155 
Because pending legislation does not consider the fair information practice 
principles that actually limit the collection, storage, and use of personal 
information (such as the principles of necessity, minimization, and finality), 
it does not adequately target the issue of discrimination.156  
The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act provides a requirement 
that a Web site’s privacy policy describe the means by which a user may 
prevent his or her personally identifiable information from being used in 
certain ways or transferred to a third party.157 Therefore, it seems to adopt an 
opt-out standard, putting the burden on the consumer to affirmatively notify 
the Web site operator that the consumer wishes to limit the uses of the 
consumer’s personal information.158  
Under this proposed legislation, if an operator requires a user to opt-out, it 
benefits from the fact that a user’s information can be used or collected 
automatically until or unless the user affirmatively elects not to have it 
 
 
 154. See GANDY, supra note 130, at 129-30 (discussing some of the results of five group 
interviews conducted in summer 1998 to assess individuals’ thoughts on privacy, particularly their 
view of legitimate uses of profiles as well as the problems they associate with them). 
 155. Id. The author cites the example moderators gave the participants in an interview: a woman 
whose credit card application was rejected because her profile indicated she was an English major. Id. 
Participants criticized the impersonal nature of profiling. Id. For example, insurance companies use 
information, such as your age and gender, to decide your insurance premiums. Decisions are based on 
statistics, not on the particular individual. Id.  
 156. Id. at 223. The author discusses David Flaherty’s twelve principles, which apply to the 
government’s use and collection of personal information. Id. He thinks these principles should be 
applied to the private sector as well. Id. See also Reidenberg, supra note 59, at 779 (criticizing self-
regulatory initiatives and the insufficiency of notice and consent in solving online consumer privacy 
issues). The author states that the self-regulatory and executive branch approach “seriously 
misconstrue basic fair information practices principles. These basic principles include key standards, 
such as purpose limitations, data minimization, and duration of storage that are not satisfied merely 
through notice and consent; notice and consent are not enough.” Id. 
 157. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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used.159 Therefore, an opt-out standard requires a user to be aware of a Web 
site’s privacy policy, savvy enough to know of its significance and 
ramifications, and willing to take the time and effort to opt-out.  
Others users, once they become aware that they may opt-out, might 
immediately take advantage of the opportunity, unless the uses of their 
personal information are set within clearly defined limits. Perhaps users 
might be more willing to forgo opting out if, in addition to being given notice 
of the uses of the information, they are (1) made aware that the purposes of 
collecting the information are limited and (2) given notice of what the 
information will not be used for.160 
Under the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the Web site operator must 
set an opt-in standard, which puts the burden on the Web site operator to 
obtain consent before using customer information.161 Thus, the user benefits 
from having his personal information not used until or unless he or she 
affirmatively elects or permits such use.162  
Under an opt-in standard, users would be given a choice as to whether or 
not to allow the collection and use of their personal information before it is 
ever used. Nevertheless, should a user decide to opt-in, the user may not be 
fully aware or informed of the consequences of a decision to allow such 
disclosure163—particularly if the notice of why and how the information is 
used and with whom it may be shared is described solely in affirmative 
terms.164 Again, perhaps these users would weigh the benefits of opting in 
more heavily, and to the Web site operator’s advantage, if in addition to 
being notified about what their personally identifiable information might be 
used for, they were also (1) given assurances that the purposes for collecting 
their information are limited and (2) given notice as to the purpose for which 
their information will not be used.165 
 
 
 
 159. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 160. Such transparency in a privacy policy would also allow consumers to be in a better position 
to make choices and improve the ability of market forces to promote privacy protection.  See John D. 
Feerick, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. P ROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 6, at 13 (2000) (describing the need to enact 
statutes that require businesses to articulate with clarity and transparency what their privacy policies 
are going to be in order to promote consumer choice and prevent market failure). 
 161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 163. See GANDY, supra  note 130, at 207. 
 164. See Feerick, supra  note 160. 
 165. Id. at 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p913 Daub.doc  2/28/2002   5:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
940 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:913 
 
 
 
 
C. The FTC 
The FTC approach of combining the continued encouragement of self-
regulatory initiatives with its proposed legislation to codify its fair 
information principles would require a minimum threshold of consumer data 
protection from all Web site operators,166 which would provide greater 
privacy protection than the status quo. However, like other pending 
legislation, the FTC approach fails to address the issue of preventing the 
discriminatory and harmful effects of the  use and collection of personal 
information.  
Codifying notice, consent, security, and enforcement does not put enough 
limits on what a Web site operator may choose to do with your 
information. 167 A Web site operator’s notice and a user’s ability to consent to 
the collection or use of personal data still leaves certain loopholes open. 
Users may not be aware of the risks to their online privacy, let alone aware of 
an operator’s notice or knowledgeable enough to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to opt-in or opt-out.168  
D. Other Approaches 
1. The European Rights-Based Approach 
At a minimum, the European Data Protection Directive codifies four fair 
information practice principles, which bear some resemblance to the FTC’s 
principles.169 Proponents of this European Directive think that the United 
States should look to it as a model for stronger data protection legislation in 
the United States.170 The European approach protects Internet users from 
certain abuses of personal data and tries to target the potential for the 
discriminatory or harmful uses of such information. The sensitive data norms 
contained in the European Data Protection Directive come closest to 
 
 
 166. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.  
 168. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Samuelson, supra note 117. The four elements of the European approach, according to 
Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, authors of Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States 
Data Protection, are: (1) data collection norms; (2) a right for individuals to review information 
collected about them; (3) sensitive data norms; and (4) enforcement norms. Id. at 763.  
 170. Id. at 763-68. According to Samuelson,  Schwartz and Reidenberg sympathize with European 
norms and argue for establishing data privacy rights. Id. They explain that the online collection and 
use of personal data is a privacy issue because people who disclose information to others about 
themselves for a particular purpose expect their disclosures to have been made under an implied 
agreement to use that data only for that purpose. Id. at 767. 
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addressing this concern.171 
In contrast, critics who take a utilitarian approach to data protection 
criticize the Directive as being too broad.172 They argue that in the spirit of 
economic self-interest and free trade, Web site operators should be able to 
benefit from the use of personal information or the fee they obtain from 
selling such information.173 Furthermore, they argue that the European 
approach inhibits innovation and impedes the flow of routine data within 
transnational corporations.174 
Moreover, even if limitations on the collection of sensitive information 
exist in the Directive, Web site operators and third parties, such as network 
advertisers, can gather similar information through tracking a user’s 
clickstream, from which sensitive personal information can be inferred.175  
2. Market-Based Approaches  
Several market-based schemes propose to deal with the privacy 
implications of online collection and use of personal data. Many economists 
recommend granting individuals property rights in their personal information 
to solve the data privacy problem.176 If individuals “owned” their 
information, as they own real property, they could convey their preferences 
to the market by charging high prices for their data if they value privacy 
highly or vice-versa.177 A licensing scheme would allow an Internet user to 
retain ownership of his or her information and grant a company permission to 
use it through a license.178 Such a scheme would allow consumers to control 
 
 
 171. Id. at 763.  
 172. See id. In this book review, the author reviews and compares two books: Data Privacy Law: 
A Study of United States Data Protection by Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, and None of 
Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive by 
Peter P. Swire and Robert E. Litan. According to Samuelson, Swire and Litan “sympathize with both 
positions.” Id. at 755. They agree with the Europeans that online personal information should be 
protected from misuse, and think Europeans having a credible interest in ensuring that other countries 
are not used to avoid the effect of European laws on European individuals. Id. 
 However, Swire, and Litan also argue that the European Directive is overbroad in that even when 
the risk of abuse from the flow of European personal data into another country with fewer personal 
data protections, such as the United States, may be small, the European Directive would restrict such 
flow. Id. In addition, they claim that the Directive may be unenforceable given the global, digital 
nature of the network. Id. at 756. 
 173. See id. at 760.  
 174. Id.  
 175. See GANDY, supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Samuelson, supra note 117, at 770-73. See also Basho, supra note 1. 
 177. See Samuelson, supra note 117, at 770-71. 
 178. See Basho, supra note 1, at 1525. The author gives the following example of a license: 
Company X is authorized to collect my name, address, income, and online buying habits. It may 
use this information to determine what products I will be most interested in buying, to make 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p913 Daub.doc  2/28/2002   5:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
942 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:913 
 
 
 
 
what information businesses have access to, which businesses have access to 
it, how businesses use it, and what kind of compensation the consumer 
should receive.179  
Although granting consumers property rights would allow them to protect 
themselves against online profiling, it is not the most desirable, feasible, or 
effective approach. First, those who view data privacy from a civil rights 
perspective would argue that granting individuals property rights in personal 
information is commodifying a civil liberty interest.180 Second, even 
proponents concede that many problems could arise under such a licensing 
scheme.181 A licensing system would be unmanageable and impractical for 
consumers and Web site operators alike in that it would involve significant 
transaction costs.182 Consumers would have to make an agreement with 
every Web site they visit, which takes time and effort for both parties.183 In 
addition, businesses could decide to deal only with those consumers willing 
to license their information or make the benefits of sharing personal 
information so enticing that consumers would decide to share almost 
anything.184 Finally, certain Web site operators might not have the resources 
to contract with users for information.185  
Another market-based approach to protecting online personal information 
is the development and use of software technology, such as the P3P software 
standard, which facilitates the negotiation between a user’s preferences and a 
Web site’s privacy policy.186 Although such technology might give users 
greater control over their online privacy just like a licensing scheme, it does 
 
 
decisions about its own product development, and to send me emails about changes to this 
product. I grant Company X the right to distribute my name only to third parties with privacy 
policies equal to Company X’s until 1/1/02 and I will receive $2.00 each time my name is 
transferred to such a third party. After 1/1/02, Company X must cease all use of this information 
and will no longer have any rights or interest in it. 
Id.  
 179. Id. at 1529. 
 180. See Samuelson, supra  note 117, at 772. The author gathers that “[f]or those who embrace the 
civil rights concept of data privacy, the notion of protecting personal data by commodifying it would 
likely be as obnoxious as the notion of protecting the voting franchise by commodifying it.” Id. 
 181. See Basho, supra note 1, at 1527-29. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. In order to address this problem, businesses called infomediaries, are beginning to arise. 
Id. Infomediaries, such as Lumeria, negotiate information transactions between users and Web site 
operators and act as brokers. Id. However, these infomediaries are in the development stage, therefore 
their success is uncertain. Id. at 1528.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1529. If consumers are not permitted to access Web sites that have not accepted their 
license agreements because they do not have the resources to enter into these contracts, these Web 
sites may lose a lot of business. Id. 
 186. See supra Part II.D.2. 
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not sufficiently protect online privacy.187 First, the W3C has not obtained 
enough agreement within the industry to conclude the development phase of 
P3P technology or find enough companies willing to implement the 
technology.188 Second, the P3P solution is too complicated for most Internet 
users—too many “privacy preferences” will only distract consumers away 
from achieving the simple goal of keeping their personal information 
private.189 Third, for Web site operators to encode their Web site’s privacy 
policies in P3P format, a significant mass of Internet users will have to use 
it.190 Fourth, even if P3P were universal, it would not be enforceable.191 
Another market-based solution is to use software programs such as 
anonymous browsers or cookie managers to protect online privacy.192 Many 
of these software packages provide a wide variety of levels of online privacy 
protection and cost.193 The major weakness of this solution, however, is that 
it safeguards the privacy of only those consumers who are educated enough 
to know about these programs, are technologically savvy enough to 
understand and know how to use them, and can afford to purchase them.194 
In addition, users that employ these software programs may be refused 
certain benefits, such as personalization, a free service, or acceptance into a 
Web site’s membership if they do not disclose personal information.195 
3. An Approach Combining Law and Technology 
This approach gives users greater control over their online privacy just 
like the other market-based approaches with the added advantage of the 
government backing the scheme.196 However, government support of this 
 
 
 187. See Rotenberg, supra note 125. 
 188. Id. at 23. 
 189. See Rotenberg, supra note 125, at 13.  
 190. See Netanel, supra  note 119, at 479 (noting that users who wish to use P3P will face the 
failure of collective action because Web site operators will prefer to lose these customers than risk the 
value of obtaining data from the majority of customers who don’t use P3P).  
 191. Id. at 480. P3P would not prevent Web site operators from deviating from its information 
practices. Id. Netanel recommends government regulation requiring Web site operators to implement 
P3P and to enforce it. Id. 
 192. See generally Graven, supra note 32. 
 193. See Graven, supra  note 32. Without software programs, such as cookie managers, most 
browsers accept all cookies by default. Id. A user can change his or her browser’s security settings to 
accept all, reject all, or be notified each time a cookie is encountered. Id. However, the first option 
means a user’s surfing habits will be monitored and tracked without limits, and this information will be 
resold to online marketers and advertisers; the second option means never receiving a customized Web 
site experience; and the third option is tiresome. Id.  
 194. For an idea of how these software programs work and their cost range, see id. 
 195. Basho, supra  note 1, at 1524. 
 196. See supra Part II.D.3. 
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technology is dependent upon the other parties involved, including users and 
the industry.197 As previously discussed, the W3C has neither obtained 
enough agreement within the industry to conclude the development phase of 
P3P technology nor has it found enough companies willing to implement the 
technology.198 In addition, the P3P solution is too complicated for most 
Internet users.199 As long as these other parties do not support the 
development and use of this technology, the government will be hard pressed 
to support it.200 
 
4. Common Law Tort Protection 
 
This approach is an insufficient way to protect online personal 
information because courts generally maintain a deferential negligence 
standard.201 They tend to require significant personal injury before requiring 
transgressors to pay damages to victims.202 If many individuals suffer harm 
due to the collection and use of online personal information, but each 
individual’s harm is minimal, the value of judgment for each individual’s 
case often prevents adjudication and settlement.203 While a class action may 
be appropriate in this situation, judges will often refuse to certify these kinds 
of classes because each individual will suffer different injuries and 
damages.204  
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW STANDARD 
In order to target the discriminatory and harmful effects of the online 
collection and use of personal information, legislation regulating online 
consumer privacy should replace the traditional fair information practice 
principles of notice and consent with the principle of purpose (while 
maintaining the other FTC principles).205 Notice informs users how their 
personal information is collected and used, while consent allows users to give 
or deny permission of the use of their information.206 Purpose would not do 
away with notice and consent; rather, it would incorporate both principles, in 
 
 
 197. See supra Part II.D.3.  
 198. See Rotenburg, supra  note 21, at 23. 
 199. Id. at 13. 
 200. See supra Part II.D.3.  
 201. Safier, supra  note 6, ¶ 108. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text; Part II.A. 
 206. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text; Part II.A. 
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addition to putting minimal limits on how online personal information is 
collected and used.207 
In order for a Web site operator to adopt the principle of purpose, it would 
have to meet the following criteria. First, it would need to limit the use of 
personal data (collected directly, through tracking clickstreams or through 
depositing cookies), for the purpose of targeted advertising, to those who opt-
in.208 Second, it would prohibit any internal uses of personal information that 
have discriminatory and harmful effects, such as price discrimination.209 
Third, it would use discretion in sharing or selling personal information with 
third parties. Lastly, it would expressly inform users as to the purposes for 
which their information will be used as well as the purposes for which their 
information will not be used.210 
The following is an example of a statement in a privacy policy that would 
incorporate purpose:  
Personal information will not be used to further discriminatory and 
harmful ends, such as price discrimination, or sold to third parties, 
such as insurance companies, credit agencies,211 or health 
organizations, which would use the information to further such ends. 
Targeted or personalized advertising is one purpose of the collection 
of personal information, but only if users choose to opt-in to this 
practice.212 If personal information is sold to third parties for a fee or 
shared with them, discretion will be used in contracting with the third 
parties, and the purpose for which these third parties are using this 
information will be scrutinized. 
Formal regulation is the best approach to targeting the discriminatory and 
 
 
 207. In the alternative, purpose could be added as a separate principle. However, since overlap 
exists among each principle’s function it seems more reasonable to consolidate them. 
 208. See Gandy , supra  note 9, at 128-29 (advocating a statutory requirement of fully informed, 
affirmative consent that favors the individual over the organization); Reidenberg, supra  note 59, at 780 
(noting how the FCC found opt-out to be an insufficient basis for the protection of personal 
information under the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
 209. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 210. See Feerick, supra note 160, at 14. 
 211. Although the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCA) regulates “consumer reports” that 
“consumer reporting agencies” collect and use, it does not apply to any other kind of personal 
information (such as basic demographics, medical information, or personal habits or preferences) that 
can be collected online. The FRCA defines a consumer report as involving a consumer’s 
creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d),(f) (2000); 
Interview with Michael Greenfield, Professor, Washington University School of Law, in St. Louis, 
Mo. (Feb. 1, 2001).  
 212. See supra note 208. 
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harmful effects of online profiling.213 The FTC’s 2000 Survey demonstrates 
that too many loopholes exist in the self-regulatory approach to effectively 
protect online privacy.214 Regulation ensures that consumers are guaranteed 
at least a modicum of protection of their personal information, no matter 
which Web site they visit.215  
Although the e-commerce industry should be able to benefit from 
legitimate uses of personal information, it should not be able to benefit from 
abuses of such information.216 A basic level of protection should be in place 
for harmful or discriminatory uses of personal information collected 
online.217  
As many of the proposed bills in Congress make clear, the fair 
information practice principles of notice and consent are crucial to protecting 
online privacy.218 However, these two principles would be more effective if 
they were incorporated within the principle of purpose. When a Web site 
operator states the purposes for which it collects and uses personal 
information, it is putting users on notice as well.219 Purpose limitations also 
connote that information will not be used in ways that are not consented to.220 
Besides being able to incorporate notions of notice and consent, purpose adds 
narrow limits to what a Web site operator can do with a user’s personal 
information.  
Codifying purpose in this way conveys to users that the operator is aware 
of these limits. Instead of merely informing them and giving them a choice, a 
Web site operator conveys through purpose that users will be protected from 
discriminatory and harmful information practices, regardless of whether or 
not they have notice or have given consent.  
Purpose should be included in online privacy legislation in order to target 
the discriminatory and harmful effects of the online collection and use of 
personal information for several reasons. First, purpose has traditionally been 
 
 
 213. See supra Parts II.B, III.B. A major criticism of regulation comes from those who believe in 
the free market and believe that if the market acts rationally, it will create privacy protections. 
However, the market does not act rationally when consumers do not understand their choices or have a 
lack of information about them, resulting in market failure. One explanation for this market failure is 
the lack of transparency and clarity in the way that privacy policies are written. See Feerick, supra note 
160. 
 214. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 216. For support of this view, see generally Belgum, supra  note 10; Reidenberg, supra  note 59; 
Safier, supra  note 6; Gandy, supra note 9. 
 217. For support of this view, see generally Belgum, supra  note 10; Reidenberg, supra  note 59; 
Safier, supra  note 6; Gandy, supra note 9. 
 218. See supra Part II.B. 
 219. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/5
p913 Daub.doc  2/28/2002   5:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] NEW STANDARD FOR PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION 947 
 
 
 
 
articulated as a fair information practice principle. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has enumerated eight 
basic principles, including collection limitation, purpose specification, and 
use limitation. 221 In addition, scholars have identified principles such as 
necessity, minimization, and finality, which limit collection “to that which is 
necessary and relevant” and require purposes to be determined before 
information is collected.222 
Second, the principle of purpose should be included in any online privacy 
legislation in order to circumvent partisan politics in Congress and get 
Republicans and Democrats to agree on common ground.223 If the legislation 
focuses on targeting the harmful or discriminatory risks involved in the lack 
of online privacy, then it is more likely that Republicans will join forces with 
the Democrats.224 
A third reason to include purpose as a principle is in order to shift the 
burden of protecting an individual’s online privacy away from the user and 
onto the Web site operator.225 The public is not knowledgeable enough about 
the risks to their online privacy, let alone how to protect its online privacy.226 
 
 
 221. Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy over the Internet: Has the Time Come to Abandon Self-
Regulation? 48 CATH . U. L. REV. 1183, 1206 (1999). The OECD drafted its own privacy guidelines, 
which the United States helped negotiate and endorsed, enumerating eight basic principles: collection 
limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual 
participation, and accountability. Id. In 1998, the OECD determined that these privacy guidelines 
applied to protecting privacy on the Internet. Id. at 1207.  
 222. See GANDY, supra note 130, at 223 (arguing that David Flaherty’s principles should apply to 
government actors as well as private actors). David Flaherty identifies several principles he thinks 
should regulate the control of personal information systems under government control including 
openness, necessity, minimization, finality, informed consent, controlling linkage and exchange, 
accuracy, access, and anonymity. DAVID FLAHERTY,  PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETIES 380 (1989).  
 223. See 146 CONG.  REC. S11,777 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2000). In his speech evaluating efforts to 
enact privacy legislation during the 106th Congress, Senator Leahy criticized partisan politics: 
During this Congress, for example, instead of focusing on ways to enhance privacy safeguards, the 
largest number of hearings (thirteen) and innumerable briefings held by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee or its subcommittees were directed at dissecting the manner in which the Department 
of Justice handled the investigation and prosecution of certain cases involving national security-
related information and campaign financing . . . . In our next Congress, it is my hope that we will 
not be distracted by such partisan pursuits, but that are time will be better spent on crafting privacy 
legislation that will make a real difference in the lives of every American. 
Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Gandy, supra note 9, at 77-80 (discussing the “growing disparity between what 
individuals know about the organizations whose actions influence their lives and what these 
organizations know about them”). 
 226. Id. In a telephone survey conducted in 1994, 26% of the respondents who expressed a 
concern about an “interactive profiling system” were unable to indicate what bothered them about the 
system while 61% of those who expressed this concern identified informational privacy as the source 
of their concern. Id. at 122. In addition, 69% of the respondents agreed that it was a “bad thing” that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p913 Daub.doc  2/28/2002   5:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
948 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:913 
 
 
 
 
If users lack such knowledge, then providing them with notice and the ability 
to opt-in or opt-out will not protect them from harmful collection or use of 
their personal information.227  
Fourth, the principle of purpose will boost overall user confidence in 
surfing the web, registering at Web sites, and in online shopping.228 If users 
have a minimum expectation that Web site operators will be held 
accountable if they collect or use personal information in a way that has 
adverse discriminatory or harmful effects, they might decide not to opt-out or 
they might decide to opt-in.229 Although purpose would be shifting the 
burden away from user and onto the Web site operator, it would benefit both 
parties.230 
Finally, the principle of purpose should be included in online privacy 
legislation, as a means of preventing harmful or discriminatory effects, in 
order to preserve a benefit of the Internet that does not exist in real space.231 
One of the benefits of anonymity on the Internet is equality.232 Depriving 
users of the right to keep their personal information (including demographics, 
financial and medical information, and surfing habits) private is depriving 
society of one of the most basic advantages of the Internet.233 
CONCLUSION 
Enacting legislation is the best approach to protecting online consumer 
privacy. The other approaches—self-regulation and market-based 
 
 
information such as income level, residential area, and credit card use could be used to “offer goods 
and services to you.” Id. at 123.  
 Moreover, because online behavior is tracked at different times and different locations, each new 
piece of information that is collected is added to a profile one at a time. Therefore, an online profile 
describes “knowledge” about behavior in probabilistic terms—making a user unable to protect his or 
her privacy interests. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of 
the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH L.J. 27, 37-38 (1995).  
 227. See Reimon, supra note 226, at 220. 
 228. See Basho, supra note 1, at 1513-14. The author notes that “the market’s failure to provide 
consumers with adequate control over their personal information undermines consumer confidence in 
e-commerce. Therefore, businesses can increase online commerce by creating and abiding by fair 
privacy policies. In fact, the Internet marketplace is beginning to realize that ‘good privacy practices 
are good business.’” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 1509 (contending that current American privacy laws and self-regulatory regimes 
do not “succeed in balancing consumers’ interests in controlling uses of their information and 
benefiting from its disclosure with commercial entities’ interest in obtaining and using that 
information”). 
 231. LESSIG, supra  note 42. 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. 
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approaches—are not widespread, effective, or feasible. More specifically, 
this legislation must target the adverse discrimination and harmful effects 
that result from the online collection and use of personal information.  
Although some current legislative proposals codify notice, consent, 
access, and security, they do not adequately target this problem. A bill that 
would accomplish this goal would codify the principle of purpose, 
incorporating the principles of notice and consent and putting limits on the 
uses of personal information, in order to prohibit Web site operators from 
using personal information towards further harmful or discriminatory ends.  
Legislation that addresses a real problem that underlies the lack of online 
privacy will be more likely to pass muster in Congress, balance users’ 
privacy rights against the interests of the e-commerce industry, and safeguard 
the equality that results from anonymity on the Internet. 
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